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This paper proposes a simple macroeconomic model with staggered investment
decisions. The expected return from investing depends on demand expectations,
which are pinned down by fundamentals and history. Owing to an aggregate de-
mand externality, investment subsidies can improve welfare in this economy. The
model can be used to address questions concerning the timing of stimulus policies:
should the government spend more on preventing the economy from falling into a
recession or on rescuing the economy when productivity picks up? Results show the
government should strike a balance between both objectives.
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1 Introduction
The recent recession is often explained by a combination of fundamental shocks and
pessimistic expectations. The narrative goes like this: a negative shock from the financial
sector spread to the rest of the economy and led firms to reduce investment. Low levels
of economic activity have since persisted because, owing to low demand expectations,
firms have been reluctant to resume previous levels of investment. In turn, this reduced
investment has contributed to low demand, justifying pessimistic expectations. Hence a
dynamic coordination problem lies at the heart of the recession.
Following the large investment slump of 2008-2009, stimulus packages around the
world have been proposed and implemented.1 These fiscal packages can be seen as at-
tempts to mitigate dynamic coordination failures. By providing incentives for investment,
governments hope to boost demand expectations and drive the economy to a situation
with higher expected and realized economic activity.
This paper develops a simple macroeconomic model that captures that dynamic co-
ordination problem among producers. The model features monopolistic competition and
staggered investment decisions. An investment is a payment of a fixed cost that increases
production capacity. Producers of each variety receive investment opportunities according
to an exogenous Poisson process. That is a simple way to capture the idea that capital
can not adjust overnight, leaving an important role in the model for expected demand.
When deciding whether to invest or not, a producer has to form expectations on others’
future decisions. If producers with subsequent investment opportunities choose to take
them, the demand for a given variety shifts to the right, leading to a larger price and larger
profits. Hence investment decisions are strategic complements, as in Kiyotaki (1988).
Investment decisions depend not only on expected demand but also on productivity.
If the increase in production resulting from investing is large enough, then investing is a
dominant strategy. Likewise, if productivity is very low, investing is a dominated strategy.
In an intermediate range, a producer’s decision depends on his expectations about the
actions of others. In a world with no shocks, that gives rise to multiple equilibria, but
once we allow for shocks, that is not true anymore, as in Frankel & Pauzner (2000).
Demand expectations are pinned down by fundamentals and history. The equilibrium
of the model is characterized by a cutoff strategy given by a threshold that depends on
the exogenous productivity parameter (fundamental) and the mass of producers that are
currently operating at full capacity, which results from their recent choices (history). For a
given level of fundamentals, producers choose to invest if the mass of producers operating
at full capacity is sufficiently high, since that positively affects both demand today and
1The objective of stimulating the economy has been translated into concrete policies in a number of
different ways, such as: cuts in energy prices, tax cuts, subsidized loans and fiscal incentives to investment
(either to the whole economy or to specific industries). Khatiwada (2009) provides a comprehensive review
of those policies.
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the actions of others tomorrow. Recessions are triggered by shocks on fundamentals, but
expectations about others’ actions play a key role.
Investment generates positive externalities because a producer does not take into ac-
count the effects of her investment decisions on others’ profits. Thus investment subsidies
can mitigate coordination failures. The model provides a tractable framework that can
be used to analyze stimulus policies that aim at affecting “market confidence”. Demand
expectations are important to determine investment decisions. Beliefs about others’ ac-
tions are pinned down in the model, so we can understand how stimulus measures affect
producers’ demand expectations and investment.
The dynamic framework is particularly suitable to answer questions regarding the
timing of govenment interventions. In particular, consider a policy maker with a certain
budget to be spent in fiscal stimulus. Is preventing a recession better than rescuing the
economy after an investment slump has already occurred? Or should policy makers give
up early on avoiding a recession and provide incentives for producers once fundamentals
have improved? How should incentives vary with economic activity and fundamentals?
The question can be posed in the following way: the equilibrium threshold can be
represented as a curve in a two-dimensional space, with productivity in the horizontal
axis and the measure of agents operating at full capacity in the vertical axis. Agents
choose to invest if the economy is at the right of the threshold. The threshold is negatively
sloped, implying that when the mass of producers operating at full capacity is larger, a
producer requires a smaller level of productivity to invest. The government intervention
aims at shifting the equilibrium threshold so that more producers will choose to invest.
Besides translating the threshold to the left, how should it try to rotate the threshold?
Should it try to estimulate investment primarily when most producers are still operating
at full capacity, despite relatively weak fundamentals, in order to avoid an investment
slump? Or should the policy maker focus on subsidizing investment when few producers
are operating at full capacity, but productivity is picking up?
Neither of those is the answer. The government should shift the threshold to the
left, increasing the region where investment occurs, but not rotate it. Trying to avoid
a recession when productivity is very low, or trying to rescue the economy when the
mass of agents is very low are both very expensive. Notwithstanding the importance of
the demand externality, the equilibrium threshold features a balance between changes in
fundamentals and in economic activity that should not be significantly affected by the
government intervention.
The threshold arising from this policy (roughly) coincides with the results of a policy
that prescribes a constant subsidy in every state of the world.2 The optimal policy estab-
2The conclusions are based on numerical results, so we cannot make statements about the exact
differences (if any) between a threshold implemented by a stimulus policy prescribing constant subsidies
and the policy that shifts the threshold to the left (without rotation).
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lishes a maximum level of subsidies to investment that is independent on productivity,
capacity utilization and economic activity. Intuitively, at the margin, the objective is to
get the largest possible mass of producers to invest with a given amount of resources,
so preventing the economy from falling into a recession or rescuing the economy once
productivity picks up are equally important.
The demand externalities that play a key role in this paper are in the seminal contribu-
tions by Blanchard & Kiyotaki (1987) and Kiyotaki (1988). When others produce more,
the demand for a particular variety shifts to the right, and its producer finds it optimal
to increase production. In Kiyotaki (1988), multiple equilibria arise because of increasing
returns to scale. The model in this paper would also give rise to multiple equilibria in the
absence of shocks to fundamentals or timing frictions, owing to the assumption of a fixed
cost that increases production capacity.
A branch of the literature takes expectations to be driven by some “sunspot” variable,
or simply, in the words of Keynes, by “animal spirits”. Depending on agents expectations,
coordination failures might arise and an inefficient equilibrium might be played.3 Despite
generating interesting insights, this approach does not allow us to understand how policies
directly affect expectations.4
This paper is closely related to the theoretical contributions in Frankel & Pauzner
(2000) and Frankel & Burdzy (2005) that resolve indeterminacy in dynamic models. They
study models with time-varying fundamentals and timing frictions similar to the ones
employed in this paper, and prove there is a unique rationalizable equilibrium in their
models.5 The uniqueness result in Frankel & Pauzner (2000) requires very small mean
reversion, but Frankel & Burdzy (2005) generalize some of the results in Frankel & Pauzner
(2000) for more general stochastic processes.6 We use some of their theoretical results
to show that a threshold equilibrium exists, and that there is a unique rationalizable
equilibrium for a sequence of models that converges to our model. This paper is also
related to the global games literature, which has been used to study a wide variety of
economic problems that exhibit strategic complementarities, but differently from that
literature, there is no asymmetric information in this model.7
There has not been much work applying those theoretical insights to understand the
effects of stimulus packages on coordination. One important exception is Sa´kovics &
Steiner (2012). They build a model to understand who matters in coordination problems:
3See, e.g., Cooper & John (1988).
4Government policies can surely affect the region where multiple equilibrium exist, but when the
economy is inside that region, models with multiple equilibria cannot predict which one will be played.
5Models with time-varying fundamentals and timing frictions have been used to study other dynamic
coordination problems. Frankel & Pauzner (2002) employ a similar structure in order to analyze the
timing of neighborhood change. Guimaraes (2006) studies speculative attacks. Levin (2009) studies the
persistence of group behavior in a collective reputation model. He & Xiong (2012) study debt runs.
6See also Burdzy et al. (2001).
7See the seminal papers by Carlsson & Van Damme (1993) and Morris & Shin (1998). For a detailed
survey, see Morris & Shin (2003).
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in a recession, who should benefit from government subsidies? The results point that the
government should subsidize sectors that have a large externality on others but that are
not much affected by others’ actions.
Coordination and strategic complementarities also play a key role in the models of
Angeletos & La’O (2010) and Angeletos & La’O (2013). They show in an environment
with noisy and dispersed information how self-fulfilling fluctuations can emerge. The
reasons for strategic complementarities in those models and in this one are similar. How-
ever, our focus is not on noisy and heterogeneous information, fundamentals are common
knowledge here, all the action comes from dynamic frictions. This makes our framework
specially suitable to study the dynamic interplay between economic activity and produc-
tivity. Expectations also play a key role in the literature of news-driven business cycles
(e.g., Beaudry & Portier (2006)), but here expectations about future productivity depend
solely on the current state of the economy. In the models of Lorenzoni (2009) and Eusepi
& Preston (2011), it is noisy information about current variables that leads to excessive
optimism or pessimism about the future.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the
policies analyzed in the paper, Section 4 describes and analyzes the results and section 5
concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Time is continuous. A composite good is produced by a perfectly competitive repre-
sentative firm. At time t, Yt units of the composite good are obtained by combining a
continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], using the technology:
Yt =
(ˆ 1
0
y
(θ−1)/θ
it di
)θ/(θ−1)
, (1)
where yit is the amount of intermediate good i used in the production of the composite
good at time t and θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. The zero-profit condition implies
ˆ 1
0
pityitdi = PtYt, (2)
where Pt is the price of the composite good and pit is the price of good i at time t.
There is a measure-one continuum of agents who discount utility at rate ρ. Agent
i ∈ [0, 1] produces intermediate good i. Her instantaneous utility at time t is given by
Ut = Ct, where Ct is her instantaneous consumption of the composite good. Since yit is
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the quantity produced by agent i at time t, her budget constraint is given by
PtCt ≤ pityit ≡ wi.
Prices are flexible and each price pit is optimally set by agent i at every time. Since goods
are non storable, supply must equal demand at any time t.
Investment is a sunk cost that reduces marginal cost of production. The assumptions
on technology aim at modelling staggered investment decisions in a simple and tractable
way. There are 2 states, High and Low. An agent in state Low can produce up yLt units at
zero marginal cost at every time t, and an agent in state High can produce up to yHt units
at zero marginal cost, with yHt = AtxH and yLt = AtxL, where xH > xL are constants
and At is a time-varying productivity parameter. Agents get a chance to switch states
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α. Once an individual is picked up, he
chooses a state and will be locked in this state until he is selected again. Choosing state
Low is costless. Choosing state High implies a one-off cost ψ in units of the composite
good (ψ is a stock).
Choosing state High can be interpreted as an investment decision. The cost ψ can
be thought of as the cost of a machine and the difference yHt − yLt as the resulting gain
in productivity. This machine will become obsolete after some (random) time (so α also
plays the role of a depreciation rate). Moreover, agents are locked in a state until the
next investment opportunity arises, which captures the idea that firms cannot change
their capital level overnight.8 Real world investments require a lot of planning and take
time to become publicly known, so investments from different firms are not syncronized.
The Poisson process generates staggered investment decisions in a simple way. As an
implication, investment decisions depend on expectations about others’ actions in the
near future.
Investment requires agents to acquire a stock of composite goods, which cannot be
funded by their instantaneous income, so we assume agents can trade assets and borrow to
invest. Owing to the assumption of linear utility, any asset with present value equal to ψ
is worth ψ in equilibrium. For example, an agent might issue an asset that pays (ρ+α)ψdt
at every interval dt until the investment depreciates (ρψdt would be the interest payment
and αψdt can be seen as an amortization payment since debt is reduced from ψ to 0
with probability αdt). Since agents are risk neutral, there are other types of assets that
would deliver the same results. The assumption of linear utility implies that consumption
smoothing plays no role in the model, all results come from investment decisions.
8In another possible interpretation, ψ could be the cost of hiring a worker that cannot be fired until
his contract expires. In that case, the fixed cost would not be paid at once, but that makes no difference
in the model.
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Let at = log(At) vary on time according to
dat = η(µ− at)dt+ σdZt, (3)
where η ≥ 0, σ > 0 and Zt is a standard Brownian motion. The parameter η determines
how fast at returns to its mean, given by µ.
2.2 Equilibrium
The composite-good firm chooses its demand for each intermediate good taking prices are
given. Using (1) and (2), we get
pit = y−1/θit Y
1/θ
t Pt,
for i ∈ [0, 1], and the price of the composite good is given by:
Pt ≡
(ˆ 1
0
p1−θit di
)1/(1−θ)
.
Since marginal cost is zero and marginal revenue is always positive, an agent in state Low
will produce yLt, and an agent in state High will produce yHt. Thus at any time t, there
will be two prices in the economy, pHt and pLt (associated with production levels yHt and
yLt, respectively). Hence the instantaneous income available to individuals in each state
is given by
wHt = pHtyHt = y
θ−1
θ
Ht Y
1
θ
t Pt (4)
and
wLt = pLtyLt = y
θ−1
θ
Lt Y
1
θ
t Pt. (5)
Moreover, using (1),
Yt =
(
hty
θ−1
θ
Ht + (1− ht)y
θ−1
θ
Lt
) θ
θ−1
, (6)
where ht is the measure of agents locked in state H.
The indirect utility over consumption goods for an agent with income equal to w is
given by w/Pt. Combining (4), (5) and (6), we get the instantaneous utility of individuals
locked in each state:
u(yHt, ht) = y
θ−1
θ
Ht
(
hty
θ−1
θ
Ht + (1− ht)y
θ−1
θ
Lt
) 1
θ−1
and
u(yLt, ht) = y
θ−1
θ
Lt
(
hty
θ−1
θ
Ht + (1− ht)y
θ−1
θ
Lt
) 1
θ−1
.
Let pi(ht, at) be the difference between instantaneous utility of agents locked in state High
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and agents locked in state Low when the economy is at (ht, at). Then
pi(ht, at) = eat
(
htx
θ−1
θ
H + (1− ht)x
θ−1
θ
L
) 1
θ−1
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
)
. (7)
Function pi is increasing in both at and ht. The effect of at captures the supply side incen-
tives to invest: a larger at means a higher productivity differential between agents who
had invested and those who had not. The effect of ht captures the demand side incentives
to invest: a larger ht means a higher demand for a given variety. The equilibrium price of
a good depends on how large yit/Yt is, so a producer benefits from others producing yHt
regardless of how much she is producing. Nevertheless, since θ > 1, an agent producing
more reaps more benefits from a higher demand.
One key implication of (7) is that there are strategic complementarities: the higher
the production level of others, the higher the incentives for a given agent to increase her
production level.
A strategy is as a map s(ht, at) 7→ {Low,High}. An agent at time t = τ that has to
decide whether to invest will do so if
ˆ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+α)(t−τ)Eτ [pi(ht, at)]dt ≥ ψ.
In words, investing pays off if the discounted expected additional profits of choosing state
High are larger than the fixed cost ψ. Future profits pi(ht, at) are discounted by the sum
of the discount rate and depreciation rate (ρ+ α).9
Investment decisions depend on expected profits. Producers will decide to invest
not only if productivity is high, but also if they are confident they will be able to sell
their varieties at a good price. Hence investment decisions crucially depend on demand
expectations, which in turn are determined by expectations about the path of at and ht.
2.3 Benchmark case: no shocks
Consider the case where the fundamental a does not vary over time, σ = 0. Proposition
1 characterizes conditions under which we have multiple equilibria in this case.
Proposition 1 (No Shocks). Suppose σ = 0 and a = µ. There are strictly decreasing
functions aL : [0, 1] 7→ < and aH : [0, 1] 7→ < with aL(h) < aH(h) for all h ∈ [0, 1] such
that
1. If a < aL(h0) there is a unique equilibrium, agents always choose state Low;
2. If a > aH(h0) there is an unique equilibrium, agents always choose state High;
9As a tie breaking convention, whenever an agent chooses High whenever she is indifferent between
states High and Low.
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3. If aL(h0) < a < aH(h0) there are multiple equilibria, that is, both strategies High
and Low can be long-run outcomes.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 1 illustrates the result of Proposition 1. If the productivity differential is
sufficiently high, agents will invest as soon as they get a chance and the economy will
move to a state where h = 1 (and there it will rest). If the productivity differential is
sufficiently low, the gains from investing are offset by the fixed cost, so not investing is a
dominant strategy. If the fundamental a is in an intermediate area, there are no dominant
strategies: the optimal investment decision depends on expectations about what others
will do. Cycles are possible in this economy, but their existence depends on exogenous
changes in beliefs. Demand expectations are not pinned down by the parameters that
characterize the economy and its current state.
Figure 1: Equilibria without shocks
All choose Low
a
h = 1
h = 0 a
All choose HighMultiple Equilibria
a
2.4 General case
We now turn to the general case where productivity varies over time, σ > 0. We say that
an agent is playing according to a threshold a∗ : [0, 1] 7→ < if she chooses High whenever
at > a
∗(ht) and Low whenever at < a∗(ht). Function a∗ is an equilibrium if the strategy
profile where every player plays according to a∗ is an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Existence). Suppose σ > 0. There exists a strictly decreasing function
a∗ such that a∗ is an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 builds on Frankel & Pauzner (2000) to show that a threshold equilibrium
always exists. The threshold function a∗ is decreasing in h, so a larger h implies that agents
are willing to invest for lower values of a. In a threshold equilibrium, beliefs about others’
investment decisions are pinned down by fundamentals (a) and history (h). Demand
expectations fluctuate because shocks to at and movements in ht might trigger changes
on expectations about others’ actions. Figure 2 shows an example of equilibrium in the
model.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with shocks
All choose Low
a
h = 1
h = 0
All choose High
a∗
Let V (a, h, a˜) be the utility gain from choosing High obtained by an agent in state
(a, h) that believes others will play according to threshold a˜. Then
V (a, h, a˜) =
ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ+α)tE[pi(ht, at)|a, h, a˜]dt− ψ, (8)
where E[pi(ht, at)|a, h, a˜] denotes the expectation of pi(ht, at) of an agent in state (a, h)
that believes others will play according to a˜. An agent choosing when a = a∗(h) and
believing all others will play according to the cutoff a∗ is indifferent between High and
Low, which means that V (a∗(h), h, a∗) = 0, for every h.
2.4.1 On equilibrium uniqueness
We do not have a strong uniqueness result. However, we can show that our model can
be seen as a limiting case of a sequence of models that have a unique rationalizable
equilibrium.
In order to apply the results of Frankel & Burdzy (2005), we need to make two changes
in the model. First, the diffusion process for at is given by equation 3, but the mean-
reversion parameter ηt varies over time so that
ηt =
η if t < T0 otherwise , (9)
where T is a large number. Second, the difference between the instantaneous utility of
agents locked in each state is given by pˆi instead of pi, where
pˆi(h, a) =
pi(h, a) if a < Mpi(h,M) otherwise , (10)
where M is a large number. One can verify that pˆi(h, a) is Lipschitz in both a and h, and
continuous. Using the results in Frankel & Burdzy (2005), we can prove there is a unique
equilibrium in this model.
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness, Frankel & Burdzy (2005)). Suppose σ > 0, the mean rever-
sion parameter ηt is given by (9) and the relative payoff of investing is given by (10). Then
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there is a unique rationalizable equilibrium in the model. Agents follow cut-off strategies,
and the cut-off can vary over time.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As M and T approach infinity, this modified model converges to our model. For
finite values of M and T , the environment is not stationary anymore: the equilibrium
strategies might vary over time. Nevertheless, agents’ behavior at time 0 is determined
by a threshold that makes agents indifferent between High and Low. For large values of
M and T , that threshold is arbitrarily close to the function a˜ that makes the expression
in (8) equal to zero.
Why does the mean reversion need to die out eventually? In case of no mean reversion
(η = 0), the iterative procedure in Frankel & Pauzner (2000) could be applied to show
equilibrium uniqueness. However, in the presence of mean reversion, the last step in the
proof of Frankel & Pauzner (2000) fails. Their proof relies on finding two boundaries,
a1(h) < a2(h) for every h ∈ [0, 1], with the same shape, such that: (i) in any equilib-
rium that survives iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, agents play Low
whenever the economy is to the left of a1(h) and High if the economy is to the right of
a2(h); and (ii) there exists hˆ ∈ [0, 1] such that an agent B at (a1(hˆ), hˆ) and agent C at
(a2(hˆ), hˆ) are indifferent between High and Low. Since a1(h) < a2(h), for every h ∈ [0, 1],
it cannot be the case that both are indifferent because both expect the same dynamics
for ht given any realization of the Brownian motion, but C expect larger values of at (be-
cause a2(hˆ) > a1(hˆ)). However, this argument fails when the process for at exhibits mean
reversion. In order to see this, consider the case where a1(hˆ) < µ and a2(hˆ) > µ. Now,
C expects at to fall, while B expects at to rise. Although C still expects larger values of
at for any realization of the Brownian motion, B expects better relative dynamics for at,
which can imply a more optimistic expectation about the dynamics of ht.
Frankel & Burdzy (2005) overcome this problem by transforming the space and time
of the stochastic process at, so the difference in instantaneous utility of agents locked
in each state can be written as a function of an i.i.d. process and time. Then, we
can follow a procedure that is similar to Frankel & Pauzner (2000) for every date t
in a transformed time-and-fundamental space. However, technical complications arise
when the mean reversion lasts forever. For a given time t, in the transformed time-and-
fundamental space, we may not be able to find a translation of a boundary such that every
agent at every date τ > t chooses Low (or High), that is, the region where no action is
dominant keeps expanding in time in the transformed fundamental space.
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3 Stimulus policies
The price of a particular variety depends positively on the quantity produced of other
goods. For instance, if others are selling yLt units of their goods, a producer will face
low demand and will only be able to sell yHt units at a low price. Consequently, one’s
profits are increasing on others’ output. Since investing has a positive externality on
other agents, we expect that without any intervention there will be underinvestment in
this economy.
We now entertain the possibility of investment subsidies in this economy. A stimulus
policy consists in a potentially state-dependent investment subsidy for agents that choose
to invest. Formally, a policy specifies a subsidy ϕ(h, a) that will be given in state (h, a)
for those who pay the fixed cost ψ. We assume the policy is perfectly anticipated by all
agents.
Suppose the government gives a constant subsidy, that is, ϕ(h, a) = d > 0 for all
(h, a). It can be shown that the equilibrium threshold shifts to the left (from a∗ to a∗p in
Figure 3). For any given h, agents require a smaller a to invest. By effectively reducing
the fixed cost ψ, the policy maker can affect the equilibrium and lead to more investment,
weakening coordination failures.
Figure 3: Constant subsidy
a
h = 1
h = 0
a∗a∗p
However, a constant subsidy would be quite expensive. An agent choosing when a is
high enough would not require extra incentives to invest. Thus there would be cheaper
ways to provide the same amount of incentives. In practice, subsidies are costly because
they have to be financed with distortionary taxation. Hence it is important to know
which stimulus policies can achieve a given result with a minimum amount of government
spending.
We now focus on minimal spending policies, which are the cheapest way to subsidize
producers that implements a certain threshold.10
Definition 1. Let a∗ be an equilibrium of the game and a∗p a continuous function such
that a∗p(h) < a∗(h), for every h. Let aˆ be the boundary where an agent is indifferent
10There would be cheaper ways to implement a threshold if policies were allowed to determine payments
from producers that strictly prefer to invest or that are not investing. However, that would not be a
stimulus policy. The objetive of this paper is to understand which policies minimize spending. It is also
important to understand which policies minimize dead-weight losses from taxation, but that is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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between High and Low when others are playing according to a∗p. The function ϕ(h, a) is
the minimal spending policy that implements a∗p if
ϕ(h, a) =
ψ −
´∞
0 e
−(ρ+α)tE[pi(ht, at)|a, h, a∗p]dt if a∗p(h) ≤ a ≤ aˆ(h)
0 otherwise
. (11)
Figure 4 shows three thresholds: a∗p is the threshold the policy wishes to implement, a∗
is the threshold without intervention and aˆ is the best response of a player that believes
others will play according to a∗p. By definition, a∗ is the best response to others playing
according to a∗. The sheer change in beliefs affects agents’ strategies: once they believe
others will play according to a∗p, they will be indifferent between High and Low at a
threshold aˆ such that aˆ(h) < a∗(h) for all h ∈ [0, 1].
A government following a minimal spending policy is committed to give an investment
subsidy to each agent in the region between a∗p and aˆ (the gray area in figure 4). The
subsidy ϕ(h, a) makes her indifferent between choosing High and Low given others will
play according to a∗p. Under those beliefs, playing according to a∗p is a best response
under this policy, so a∗p is an equilibrium. Interestingly, no subsidies are needed in the
area between aˆ and a∗
Figure 4: Example of minimal spending policy
a
h = 1
h = 0
a∗a∗p aˆ
Notice that the equilibrium under the minimal spending policy is no longer unique. If
agents believe others will play according to a∗ their best response is to play according to
a∗, and thus the policy has no effect at all.
Our aim is to compare the required government spending from policies that yield
similar results in terms of utility gains. Consider the two thresholds a∗p and a∗p′ depicted
in Figure 5 and assume both deliver the same lifetime utility for an agent born in a random
state. The objective is to know which one is less costly.
The thresholds a∗p and a∗p′ correspond to different policy objectives. A stimulus policy
that implements the threshold a∗p is not particularly concerned with either preventing the
economy from falling into a recession or rescuing the economy when productivity picks
up. In contrast, a policy that implements a∗p′ prescribes subsidies to investment when a
is relatively low while h is still high, which might keep the economy away from the region
where h falls down and avoid an investment slump.
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Figure 5: Two different minimal spending policies
a
h = 1
h = 0
a∗a∗p a
∗
p′
4 Numerical results
In order to solve the model numerically, we work with an approximation of the model
presented in section 3. Now time is discrete and each period has length ∆, where ∆ is a
small number. Hence time t ∈ {0,∆, 2∆, 3∆, ...}. The stochastic process of at is given by
at = at−1 + η(µ− at−1)∆ + σ
√
∆εt,
where εt is an iid shock with a standard normal distribution. In the beginning of each
period, after at is observed, (1−e−α∆) individuals are randomly selected and get a chance
to switch state. The instantaneous payoffs of being locked in each state are the same as
before, but now agents discount utility by the factor e−ρ∆t. When ∆ → 0, this model
converges to the model of section 3.
4.1 Threshold Computation
Our algorithm aims at finding a threshold where agents are indifferent between actions
High and Low if they believe others will play according to that threshold. The steps are
basically the following: first, pick an arbitrary threshold a∗0 and choose a finite grid for h
in the interval [0, 1]. Then, for every point h in the grid, simulate n paths of at and ht
departing from (a∗0(h), h) assuming every agent will play according to a∗0. Use those paths
to estimate the gain in utility from picking High of an agent choosing at (a∗0(h), h). That
yields an estimate of V (a∗0(h), h, a∗0). If the gain in utility is close to zero in every point
of the grid, stop. Otherwise, update a∗0 and repeat the simulation process that leads to
the estimation of V (a∗0(h), h, a∗0) until it converges.11
11Alternatively, we can assume every agent is choosing Low, find the threshold that determines the
region where playing High is a dominant strategy (call it aH0 ), then assume all agents play according to
aH0 , find again the best response and keep iterating until it converges. We can also start by assuming
all agents play High, find the region where playing Low is dominant and start the iterative process of
eliminating dominated strategies from there. Both equilibrium thresholds and the one found using the
first algorithm presented coincide, but these are more expensive in terms of computing time.
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4.2 Policy Simulations
Once the equilibrium threshold a∗ has been obtained, we consider some minimal spending
policies parameterized in the following way:
a∗c,ξ(h) = a∗(h) + ξϑ(h)− c,
where ϑ(h) = 1 − 2h, c > 0 and ξ is a real number. A policy is then a pair (ξ, c), where
c > 0 implies the threshold is shifed to the left and ξ 6= 0 implies the threshold is rotated.
Initially, we set a grid for ξ that includes zero and a value for c. We then estimate the
lifetime utility of a representative agent born in a random state (we simulate the economy
and take out the first 50 years), given the stimulus policy (0, c). We then do the same
for different values of ξ and adjust the value of c for each policy so that the utility gain
from all policies is (approximately) the same. At the end of this process, we have different
stimulus policies that deliver the same utility but different slopes.
For each policy, we find the best response of an agent (the curve aˆ in figure 4) given
that others will follow the threshold prescribed by the policy. Then we compute the gain
in utility from picking High for a set of points (in the gray area in Figure 4). Using
interpolations, we can find the subsidy needed at each point ϕ(h, a) to make the agent
indifferent between investing or not. Finally, we simulate the economy several times and
estimate the government spending under each policy by applying the formula given by
(11).
4.3 Calibration
In the baseline calibration, parameters were chosen to satisfy the following criteria:
• The mean of output in peaks is about 4% higher than in troughs, which is roughly
consistent with the data using the two-quarters definition of business cycles.12
• The economy stays 30% of time at the left of the threshold, that is, agents are not
investing 30% of the time, approximately.13 Under the stimulus policy with ξ = 0,
this number falls to 12%.
• Once the economy goes to the left of the threshold, the mean time it stays there
is 5 quarters. We consider that the economy went to the left of the threshold if it
crossed it and remained there for at least 36,5 days.14
12According to the two-quarters definition of business cycles, a recession starts when output goes down
for two consecutive quarters and ends when it increases for two consecutive quarters.
13When the economy is to the left of the treshold, no agent is investing. If that is interpreted as a
recession, this calibration implies the economy is in recession 30% of the time. Owing to the lack of a
positive trend in our productivity parameter, output is increasing roughly 50% of the time.
14That is because it is not reasonable to consider an economy is in a recession if unemployment fell for
3 consecutive days.
15
Output is computed net of depreciation, so the present value of output is equivalent to the
present value of consumption (and thus utility) in the economy. The user cost of capital
for an agent locked in state High is equal to (ρ + α)ψ. At time t, there are ht agents in
state High, so we subtract the cost of capital in the economy ht(ρ + α)ψ from the total
amount produced, given by (6).
The parameters µ and xL were normalized to zero and one, respectively. The chosen
values of the parameters θ and ρ are standard in the literature, and α was made equal to 1,
meaning that investment decisions are made once a year on average. All other parameters
in the model were chosen to match the desired statistics. Table 1 shows the parameters
(the time unit is years, when needed). In Appendix B we show that our results are robust
to different specifications.
Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Production state High xH 1.1
Production state Low xL 1
Elasticity substitution θ 6
Fixed cost of investing ψ 0.0806
Mean of fundamental process µ 0
Arrival rate of Poisson Process α 1
Standard deviation of shocks σ 0.03
Discount rate ρ 0.03
Mean reversion intensity η 0.7
Time interval lenght ∆ 0.005
4.4 Results
Figure 6 shows the equilibrium threshold and the path of the economy following a random
realization of at. At the left of the threshold, agents do not invest, so h decreases; at the
right of the threshold, agents invest, so h increases. A point (a, h) describes the current
state of the economy and, together with the equilibrium threshold, determines agents’
expectations about the future. In this example, the economy starts to the right of the
threshold at (0, 0.5), so h initially increases. About a year later, negative shocks to a
bring the economy to the left of the equilibrium threshold and h starts to decrease. At
that point, it is optimal for agents to choose Low because they expect others will do so.
Figure 7 shows output in the economy and what output would be in case h = 1. The
variance of output in this economy is about 20% higher relative to the case where h is
always equal to 1, because low values of the productivity parameter a lead to periods of
low expected demand where agents choose not to invest. In this model, policies can do
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Figure 6: Estimated threshold
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nothing about the exogenous movements in a but can increase the region where agents
invest. Investment subsidies can bring output closer to the h = 1 curve.
Besides amplifying the effects of negative shocks, the endogenous and staggered reac-
tion of h also implies that low productivity periods have long-lasting negative effects. As
shown in Figure 7, output when the economy is coming back from a recession is lower
than right before the recession for the same productivity parameter a. That occurs not
only because staggered investment decisions mechanically add persistence to output, but
also because agents require a higher productivity to invest when h is low.
We now turn to the comparison of different policies. Figure 8 shows different stimulus
policies corresponding to different values of ξ, that deliver the same welfare improvement.
The thin dashed lines are the loci where an agent is indifferent between investing and
not if she believes others will act according to the threshold implemented by the stimulus
policy. The government pays subsidies in the area between the policy threshold and its
respective thin dashed line.
Figure 8 helps understanding the different effects of each policy. Consider an economy
in a recession, with h = 0 and a = −0.045, and at is moving up towards zero. The
stimlus policy that implements the threshold with higher slope (the almost vertical line
in Figure 8) kicks in as soon as fundamentals hits a = −0.03 and keeps paying subsidies
for a long time. In contrast, the policy that implements the threshold with lower slope
prescribes subsidies only when fundamentals are close to a = −0.0075. It is likely that as
soon as subsidies start to be paid, they won’t be needed anymore, since h will go up and
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Figure 7: Output fluctuations
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the economy will cross the aˆ line. In short, while one policy prescribes large amounts of
subsidies to take the economy out of a recession, the other policy does little about it.
The flipside of these policies can be seen when the economy is in good times but
heading to a recession, say a = 0, h = 1 and the productivity parameter is moving down
towards −0.045. Both policies prescribe inventives to invest as soon as a crosses their
respective thin dashed lines (at about a = −0.022). The key difference is that now, if
productivity keeps going down, the policy that implements the high-slope threshold soon
gives up and the economy falls into a recession as soon as the value of a goes below −0.03.
Subsidies will be given again whenever productivity gets past that point. In contrast, the
low-slope stimulus policy prescribes a lot more subsidies to be spent in order to prevent
the economy from falling into a recession.
This discussion highlights the trade-off involved in the choice of the timing of fiscal
stimulus. The subsidies paid according to the low-slope policy to producers when h is high
but a is low might prevent an investment slump. Anticipating that, demand expectations
for a given variety will be larger, so producers will be more willing to invest – they will
require less subsidies to choose High. However, the anticipation that a recession will last
for a long time if negative shocks to a bring the economy to the no-investment region
reduce incentives for investment. The choice of the timing of fiscal stimulus has to take
into account that a subsidy for a producer at (a, h) affects not only her incentives to invest
but also the incentives for other producers choosing before the economy might reach that
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Figure 8: Policies
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Figure 9 shows the amount of subsidies required to coax agents to invest in two situa-
tions: when the government is not intervening in the economy, and when it is implementing
the stimulus policy with ξ = 0 in Figure 8. Under the stimulus policy, agents expect a
larger demand for their goods. As a result, they require less subsidies to invest. The
difference between both lines in Figure 9 corresponds to the gains from the increase in
expected demand caused by the stimulus policy. In this model, policies that are expected
to last and affect other agents are cheaper because staggered investment decisions are
strategic complements.
Figure 10 shows our main result. It contrasts the 3 policies in figure 8 and 2 other
intermediate policies. The figure suggests that the amount of subsidies required for a
given utility level is convex in ξ with a minimum at ξ = 0. The cheapest policy is the one
that shifts the threshold to the left without rotating it. In Appendix B, we show that the
result is robust: the minimum spending policy under alternative parameters prescribes
ξ = 0 in all specifications we tried.
The best policy does not change the shape of the threshold. Therefore, too much
emphasis on preventing an investment slump is sub-optimal, but so is trying too hard to
rescue the economy out of a recession. The government should not bias incentives one
15In the model, the timing of investment is exogenous. That assumption would have some important
undesired effects if the stimulus policies analysed here provided incentives for producers to delay invest-
ment. However, that does not occur in the model, in equilibrium producers that receive subsidies are
actually indifferent between investing or not. Larger subsidies only compensate for a lower productivity
and lower expected demand.
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Figure 9: One-off and Anticipated Subsidies
−0.028 −0.026 −0.024 −0.022 −0.02 −0.018 −0.016 −0.014 −0.012
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ϕ
(0
.5
,a
)
a
s
%
o
f
ψ
a
Subsidy with h = 0.5
ξ = 0 Policy
One-off Subsidy
Figure 10: Government spending
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way or the other. The best policy subsidizes producers according to the distance of the
economy from the original threshold.
Interestingly, the threshold arising from this policy (roughly) coincides with the results
of a policy that prescribes a constant subsidy in every state of the world. That has an
interesting implication: the maximum level of subsidies should be the same when the
economy is about to enter the no-investment region or when it is about to leave it. The
government should not pay larger subsidies when a is falling in order to try to avoid an
invesment slump or when productivity is relatively high despite low levels of investment.
Intuitively, the policy intervention aims at getting the largest possible mass of pro-
ducers to invest, since a larger h will increase the returns to others’ investments. Those
close to the original threshold are nearly indifferent between choosing Low and High. It
turns out that the distance from the original threshold can be seen as a proxy for returns
to investment and, consequently, as an indicator of the level of subsidy required to coax
a producer to invest. Hence subsidizing a producer far away from the initial threshold
is costly, the same amount fo money would bring more investment from producers closer
to the threshold. The fact that the economy will be often in some regions and rarely in
others does not affect this reasoning, since the frequency the economy is at a given point
affects how often subsidies have to be paid at that point but also how often that leads
to investment. Nevertheless, it is important to stimulate investiment in a region that
affects decisions of producers who would otherwise not invest, but all policies that shift
the threshold to the left are doing so.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper proposes a tractable dynamic macroeconomic model with staggered investment
decisions where demand expectations affect investment and might lead to coordination
failures. The model generates a rich pattern of fluctuations in output and capacity uti-
lization that can be illustrated in a simple diagram with 2 variables: productivity and
measure of agents operating at full capacity. However, such simplicity comes at a price, in
particular, producers are restricted to a binary set of actions, there are no other relevant
state variables, and agents are risk-neutral. Future research might be able to extend this
environment and relax some of those assumptions.
The model is consistent with policies that try to restore market confidence when the
economy is at a recession, and was used to study the impact of different policies aiming
at mitigating coordination failures. The equilibrium threshold for investment features a
balance between economic activity and productivity. Stimulus policies should try to shift
the threshold without affecting this balance. That means establishing a maximum level
of subsidies (or tax cuts) to investment that is independent on productivity, capacity
utilization and economic activity.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider an agent deciding at time normalized to 0 who believes that every agent that
will get an opportunity to change state will choose Low. He assigns probability 1 that the
path of ht will be h↓t = h0e−αt, which is independent of a. Thus, choosing High raises his
payoff by
U(h0, a) =
ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ+α)tpi(h↓t , a)dt− ψ
= ea
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
)ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ+α)t
(
h↓tx
θ−1
θ
H + (1− h↓t )x
θ−1
θ
L
) 1
θ−1
dt− ψ.
Therefore this agent will choose High iff U(h0, a) ≥ 0. Now, U(h0, a) is continuous and
strictly increasing in a, lima→∞ U(h0, a) =∞, and lima→−∞ U(h0, a) = −ψ. Thus for any
h0, there is a = aH(h0) such that U(h0, a) = 0. Since U(h0, a) is strictly increasing in a,
for any a′ > aH(h0) we have U(h0, a′) > 0 and thus choosing High is a strictly dominant
strategy (any other belief about the path of ht will raise the relative payoff of choosing
High). Notice that U(h0, a) is strictly increasing in both a and h0 and thus aH(h0) is
strictly decreasing.
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A similar argument proves that there exists a strictly decreasing threshold aL such that
if a < aL(h0), Low is a dominant action. Consider an agent who believes others will choose
High after him. He believes that the motion of ht will be given by h↑t = 1− (1− h0)e−αt,
so choosing High instead of Low raises his payoff by
U(h0, a) =
ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ+α)tpi(h↑t , a)dt− ψ
= ea
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
)ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ+α)t
(
h↑tx
θ−1
θ
H + (1− h↑t )x
θ−1
θ
L
) 1
θ−1
dt− ψ.
This agent will choose Low whenever U(h0, a) < 0 and, as in the previous case, we can
show that there exists a strictly decreasing threshold aL such that if a < aL(h0), Low is a
dominant action. Since for every h0 and t > 0 we have h↑t > h0 > h↓t , U(h0, a) > U(h0, a).
This implies aH(h0) > aL(h0).
Take a pair (a, h0) such that aL(h0) < a < aH(h0). Since a < aH(h0), if an agent
believes that the path of ht will be h↓t , then U(h0, a) < 0 and thus his optimal strategy
is to play Low. Therefore this belief is consistent and the strategy profile where every
player plays Low is an Nash equilibrium. Likewise, since a > aL(h0) the strategy profile
where every player plays High is also a Nash equilibrium. Hence, there is multiplicity in
this set.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In order to apply the existence arguments in Frankel & Pauzner (2000), it suffices to
show that playing High is a dominant choice for some large enough a and that Low is a
dominant choice for some small enough a. This is so because i.i.d. shocks are needed just
to show uniqueness, and Corollary 1 in Burdzy et al. (1998) guarantees that Lemma 1 in
Frankel & Pauzner (2000), used in their proof, holds for our more general process for at.
Solving dat = η(µ− at)dt+ σdZt we get that
at = a0e−ηt + µ(1− e−ηt) + σ
ˆ t
0
eη(s−t)dZs.
And thus at conditional on a0 is normally distributed with mean
E0 [at] = µ+ e−ηt(a0 − µ).
and variance
V ar0 [at] =
σ2
2η
(
1− e−2ηt
)
.
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Therefore, eat conditional on a0 follows a log-normal distribution with mean
E0 [eat ] = exp
{
µ+ e−ηt(a0 − µ) + 14
σ2
η
(
1− e−2ηt
)}
. (12)
Consider an agent deciding at some point (0, a0) who believes that ht = 0 for every t ≥ 0.
His utility gain from choosing High is
W (a0) =
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
)
x
1
θ
L
ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ+α)tE0 [eat ] dt− ψ
>
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
)
x
1
θ
L
ˆ 1
0
e−(ρ+α)t inf {E0 [eat ]}t∈(0,1) dt− ψ.
By (12), we have that lima0→∞ inf {E0 [eat ]}t∈(0,1) = ∞. Thus, there exists some large
enough a∗∗ such that High is a strictly dominant action when a > a∗∗.
Now consider an agent deciding at some point (1, a0), with a0 < µ, who believes that
ht = 1, for every t ≥ 0. His gain in utility of choosing High is given by
W (a0) =
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
)
x
1
θ
H
ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ+α)tE0 [eat ] dt− ψ
<
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
)
x
1
θ
H
(ˆ Q
0
e−(ρ+α)t
(
sup {E0 [eat ]}t∈(0,Q)
)
dt
+
ˆ ∞
Q
e−(ρ+α)t
(
µ+ σ
2
4η
)
dt
)
− ψ.
By (12), we have that lima0→−∞ sup {E0 [eat ]}t∈(0,1) = 0. For large enough Q, the integral
term is small enough, so W (a0) < 0. Hence there exists some small enough a∗∗ such that
Low is a strictly dominant action when a < a∗∗.
We have shown the existence of dominant regions. Now, as in Frankel & Pauzner
(2000) we can iteratively eliminate strictly dominated strategies. This process converges
to a threshold a∗ such that agents are indifferent between investing or not at (a∗(h), h)
for all h ∈ [0, 1], if they believe the others will play according to a∗. Given a threshold
a∗, notice that payoffs are increasing in a and h. Thus, playing according to a∗ is an
equilibrium.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Before we prove Proposition 3, it is useful to establish the following results.
Lemma 1. Let aˆt be the following latent variable
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aˆt =
at if at < Ma˜ otherwise ,
where at is given by dat = ηt(µ−at)dt+σdZt, with ηt given by (9). Then limaτ→∞Eτ
[
eaˆt
]
=
eM and limaτ→−∞Eτ
[
eaˆt
]
= 0, for every t > τ and every τ ≥ 0. Moreover, eM and zero
are, respectively, an upper bound and a lower bound for rτ (t) ≡ Eτ [aˆt], for every τ ≥ 0.
Proof. First assume τ < T . It follows from (A.2) that when τ < t < T , at|aτ has a normal
distribution with mean and variance given by (A.2) and (A.2), respectively. In that case
we have
Eτ
[
eaˆt
]
= 1
Σt
√
2pi
ˆ M
−∞
exp
at − 12
(
at − µ− e−ηt(aτ − µ)
Σt
)2 dat
+
(
1− Φ
(
M − µ− e−ηt(aτ − µ)
Σt
))
eM , (13)
where Φ is the standard normal distribution and Σt ≡ σ
√
1
2η (1− e−2ηt).
Now fix t ≥ T . In that case, we have that at|aT follows a normal distribution with
mean aT and variance σ2(t− T ). Therefore, by the law of iterated expectations,
Eτ [at] = Eτ [Eτ [at|aT ]] = Eτ [aT ] = µ+ e−ηT (aτ − µ),
where the last equality follows from equation A.2. Moreover,
V arτ [at] = Eτ [V arτ [at|aT ]] + V arτ [Eτ [at|aT ]] = σ2(t− T ) + Σ2T .
We can show that at|aτ follows a normal distribution, 16 and so,
Eτ
[
eaˆt
]
= 1√
(σ2(t− T ) + Σ2T ) 2pi
ˆ M
−∞
exp
at − 12
at − µ− e−ηT (aτ − µ)√
(σ2(t− T ) + Σ2T )
2
 dat
+
1− Φ
M − µ− e−ηT (aτ − µ)√
(σ2(t− T ) + Σ2T )
 eM . (14)
Notice that both equations 13 and 14 are continuous on aτ and that they coincide at
t = T . Taking limits with aτ → ∞ and aτ → −∞ of equations 13 and 14 completes the
proof for the case where τ < T . The proof for the case where τ ≥ T is very similar and
16We know that aT |aτ ∼ N(µ+ e−ηT (aτ − µ), σ22η (1− e−2ηT )) and at|aT , aτ ∼ N(aT , (t− T )σ2). Since
Eτ [at|aT ] is linear on aT and V arτ [at|aT ] does not depend on aT we guarantee bivariate normality of the
vector (at, aT ) conditional on aτ (see Arnold et al. (1999), p. 56) and therefore its marginal distributions
are normal.
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therefore omitted. The last sentence of the Lemma comes directly from the inspection of
equations 13 and 14 .
Lemma 2. Suppose σ > 0, the mean reversion parameter ηt is given by (9) and the
relative payoff of investing is given by (10). Then, if M is sufficiently high, there are
constants a′ and a′′, with a′ < a′′ such that if a(h) > a′′ it is strictly dominant to play
High and if a(h) < a′ it is strictly dominant to play Low.
Proof. First, notice that we can write pˆi(ht, at) = pi(ht, aˆt), for every t. Assume that an
agent deciding at some period normalized to 0 has the belief that ht = 0, for every t ≥ 0.
Thus, his payoff of investing is given by
U(a0) ≡ x
1
θ
L
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
) ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ+α)tE0
[
eaˆt
]
dt− ψ
> x
1
θ
L
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
)ˆ 1
0
e−(ρ+α)tE0
[
eaˆt
]
dt− ψ
> x
1
θ
L
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
)
e−(ρ+α) inf
{
E0
[
eaˆt
]}
t∈(0,1) − ψ.
But inf
{
E0
[
eaˆt
]}
t∈(0,1) converges to e
M when a0 goes to ∞. Thus as long as M is
suficiently high, we can get an a′′ such that U(a′′) > 0.
Now consider an agent deciding at some period τ normalized to zero that believes that
ht = 1 for every t ≥ 0. His gain in utility of investing is given by
U(a0) ≡ x
1
θ
H
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
)ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ+α)tE0
[
eaˆt
]
dt− ψ
< x
1
θ
H
(
x
θ−1
θ
H − x
θ−1
θ
L
)(ˆ Q
0
e−(ρ+α)t sup
{
E0
[
eaˆt
]}
t∈(0,Q) dt+
ˆ ∞
Q
e−(ρ+α)teMdt
)
− ψ.
But sup
{
E0
[
eaˆt
]}
t∈(0,Q) goes to zero as a0 goes to −∞. For large enough Q, the second
integral term is small enough, so for sufficiently small a′, we get U(a′) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since we have proved the existence of dominance regions, it
follows from Theorems 1 and 4 in Frankel & Burdzy (2005) (since our model is a special
case of their model).
B Robustness
We run our policy exercise using other parameters. In order to get sufficiently different
statistics from those obtained in the baseline calibration, we did not try to match the same
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statistics as before. It led to very different statistics in most specifications. The only thing
we imposed was that the economy experienced both crisis and recessions and that the
policies did not completely shut down recessions. Table 2 reports the parameters chosen
and the implied average time in recession with no intervention and under the intervention
with ξ = 0. The parameter c for the parallel policy - which defines the distance between
the original threshold and the parallel policy threshold - is not reported, since all the
relevant information about this parameter is contained in the last two lines of Table 2.
The values of ξ were chosen to contemplate the cases of an almost vertical threshold and
a threshold were the government almost does not pay subsidies when fundamentals are
picking up and the economy is leaving from a situation with h = 0, as in Figure 8. Figure
11 reports the results for government spending, showing that our results did not change
qualitatively.
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Table 2: Robustness check parameters
Specification
Parameter Symbol 1 2 3 4 5 6
Production state High xH 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.05 2 1.1
Production state Low xL 1 1 1 1 1 1
Elasticity substitution θ 6 6 6 6 6 6
Fixed cost of investing ψ 0.0408 0.0806 0.0408 0.0413 0.795 0.0278
Mean of fundamental process µ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arrival rate of Poisson Process α 2 1 2 1 1 3
Standard deviation of shocks σ 0.03 0.1 1 0.03 0.3 0.03
Discount rate ρ 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03
Mean reversion intensity η 0.7 0.7 2 1.5 0.7 0.7
Time interval lenght ∆ 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Average time in recession (%) - 26.15 43.20 33.39 38.50 37.70 55.95
Average time in recession parallel policy (%) - 10.15 35.96 14.03 4.79 16.88 24.61
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Figure 11: Government spending in each specification
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